Home › How we got here
HOW WE GOT HERE

Each decision solved something in its time. The bill came later.

This history does not assign blame. Each step had an understandable reason and a short-term result that looked good. Each episode is told in one paragraph; under “Learn more” you will find what was sought, how the result drifted away from it, and what it cost later.

1941–1972
A public utility is created to electrify the country.
Decided by: Government of PR, following the model of U.S. public development corporations.

In 1941 the government creates a public corporation, the Water Resources Authority (Autoridad de Fuentes Fluviales), to bring electricity to the whole country and support industrialization. From the start it had two jobs: selling electricity and serving the government's development policy.

Learn more
What was sought: Electricity for the whole country, in towns and countryside, and the foundation for industrialization (Operation Bootstrap, 1947).
How it drifted: From the start the utility had two jobs: selling electricity and serving the government's development policy.
What it left behind: A corporation that financed its expansion with bonds and whose decisions had a government rationale in addition to the technical one.
More context: The Water Resources Authority was created by Act 83 of May 2, 1941, and in July 1942 the private electric companies were transferred to it. Luis Muñoz Marín and Rexford Tugwell saw public corporations as development tools, with the Tennessee Valley Authority as the model (CRS).
1954–1982
A bet that oil refining would be a pillar of the economy, on the south coast.
Decided by: Government of PR (Fomento) and oil companies

To extend Operation Bootstrap, the government bets on oil refining on the south coast (CORCO, 1954–1982), and PREPA's large power plants are also located there. The refinery closed after the 1973 embargo; the plants, which burn imported fuel, stayed. For the curious: the oil bet →

Learn more
What was sought: To extend Operation Bootstrap from light manufacturing to refining and petrochemicals. The Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. (CORCO), in Peñuelas and Guayanilla, started its first unit in 1954 and operations in 1956; Teodoro Moscoso, the architect of Operation Bootstrap, led it from 1966. By 1978 it supplied 80% of the petroleum products consumed in PR and was the island's largest private employer, with 2,700 employees. Phillips, Union Carbide and PPG, among others, set up around it. PREPA's large baseload plants were also located on the south coast (Aguirre, in Salinas, with two 450 MW units that entered service in 1971 and 1972, and Costa Sur, in Guayanilla), and they burn residual fuel oil (bunker C).
How it drifted: The refinery bought most of its crude from Venezuela, and the 1973 embargo raised the price of imported crude. CORCO began shutting down operations in 1974 and, after several years under bankruptcy law, closed in March 1982. The oil business never consolidated; the power plants stayed.
What it left behind: A generation system based on imported fuel and concentrated in the south, while much of the demand is in the north, with the transmission grid as the bridge between the two. Sources: Rosario Natal, Ponce en su historia moderna; EPA; Sargent & Lundy for PREB (2021); Metro PR.
1973–1979
Oil prices quadruple, and most households are protected.
Decided by: PREPA and the government

When oil prices soar in 1973, PREPA shields about 70% of households and raises rates for everyone else. The subsidy is paid within the utility itself, which is left with less money to maintain and replace plants. By 1979, 98% of electricity came from oil.

Learn more
What was sought: That families would not have to pay for electricity that had doubled in cost from one year to the next. Households using less than 425 kWh a month (~70% of accounts) were protected; other rates doubled or tripled.
How it drifted: The subsidy was paid out of the utility's own accounts. In 1974 the bond trust agreement was signed, requiring rates “sufficient to pay the expenses of the Authority.”
What it cost: Less money to pay for plants and their replacement (CRS). In 1979, 98% of electricity came from imported oil.
More context: The 1974 trust agreement frames all subsequent debt, and in 1979 the Water Resources Authority was renamed the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) (CRS).
1989–2016
The base rate does not rise for 27 years.
Decided by: PREPA and successive governments

To keep electricity affordable, the base rate does not rise for 27 years. The gap is covered by borrowing, and part of that debt pays day-to-day expenses, not investment: by 2012 PREPA owed more than it owned and its investment was less than half that of comparable utilities. Borrowing was easy: interest on Puerto Rico bonds is tax-exempt for any U.S. investor, and demand was high. Learn more about the exemption →

Learn more
What was sought: To keep electricity affordable in a slow-growing economy, without passing every cost increase on to households.
How it drifted: Expenses kept rising and the rate did not. The fuel charge did move up and down, so bills changed, but the part that pays for plants, grid and debt stayed frozen. The gap was covered by borrowing: bonds, credit lines to buy fuel and loans from the Government Development Bank. Borrowing avoided a visible increase every year. Part of that debt paid operating expenses, not investment.
What it cost: Debt went from $7,587 million (2010) to $9,054 million (2015). Free cash flow was negative every year from 2010 to 2014 (about $2 billion in total). By 2012 PREPA owed more than it owned ($10.8 billion vs. $10.3 billion). Maintenance fell 14.6% (2007–2013), and investment was 2.6% of assets, versus ~6% at comparable utilities.
Decades
Subsidies and municipal electricity are charged on PREPA's bill.
Decided by: Legislature and government

Discounts for lower-income households and electricity for municipalities are charged on the bill instead of being approved in the budget. Other customers pay for them per kWh, about $350 million a year (FY2013), and PREPA's accounts mix the cost of providing electricity with the cost of social policy.

Learn more
What was sought: To support municipalities and lower-income households without having to approve the spending every year in the government budget.
How it drifted: Supporting those groups is one decision. Booking it inside the utility is another. Because it sits there, other customers pay for it per kWh (regardless of their income), it does not show up as government spending, and PREPA's numbers mix the cost of providing electricity with that of social policy. As of 2020, government agencies owed PREPA $487 million.
What it cost: About $350 million a year (FY2013), charged to the customers who do pay. Act 22-2016 itself called some of these subsidies an “unjustified and disproportionate burden.”
2001–2016
Each new administration appoints about 200 political managers at PREPA.
Decided by: Elected governments

Each new administration appoints about 200 trusted managers to carry out its program. But plants and maintenance outlast a four-year term: 10 executive directors in a decade, and about $192 million in canceled projects “of no use,” according to the Comptroller.

Learn more
What was sought: To have people in such a large company who would carry out the program that won the election.
How it drifted: Long-term projects (plants, conversions, maintenance) last longer than a four-year term and depended on whoever came next.
What it cost: 10 executive directors in a decade. Projects canceled halfway: ~$192 million in works “of no use” between 2010 and 2018, according to the Comptroller, such as the South Gas Pipeline (canceled in 2009, ~25% complete).
2014–2016
Credit runs out. A regulator is created, and then the Financial Oversight and Management Board.
Decided by: PR Legislature and U.S. Congress

In 2014 credit runs out. A regulator is created to take rates out of politics and, in 2016, Congress passes PROMESA and creates the Oversight Board to restructure a debt the governor called “unpayable.” Since then, many energy decisions go through the Board.

Learn more
What was sought: To take rates out of politics (Act 57-2014) and give PR a legal path to restructure a debt its governor called “unpayable” (PROMESA, 2016).
How it drifted: In 2014 the government's credit fell to junk. In May 2014 PREPA could buy fuel only with its capital fund. In fiscal year 2013 it did not meet its own rule of covering expenses and debt with at least 1.2 times its revenue (Moody's calculated less than 1). The regulator's independence protections were removed in 2018.
What it cost: A process in which many energy decisions go through the Board, and about $1.1 billion in professional fees in the bankruptcy cases, according to the government (June 2023).
More context: In 2014 a local bankruptcy law was also passed (Act 71-2014), which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down in June 2016, and PREPA signed a forbearance agreement with its creditors. PROMESA was enacted on June 30, 2016 (CRS IN11858).
2017
PREPA files for bankruptcy (July 2). Two months later, Hurricane Maria.
Decided by: Financial Oversight and Management Board

In July 2017 PREPA files for bankruptcy, with about $9 billion in debt. Two months later, Maria destroys about 80% of a grid that was already underinvested. Almost ten years later, there is no agreement with bondholders.

Learn more
What was sought: To protect service while renegotiating ~$9 billion in debt.
How it drifted: About 80% of the grid was destroyed, and the blackout lasted 328 days. The grid was already underinvested (2.6% of assets in 2012–2017). The controls that came with federal money respond to real cases, such as Whitefish.
What it cost: Almost 10 years without an agreement with bondholders, and without the ability to borrow to repair plants.
More context: In October 2017 the Whitefish contract, worth about $300 million and awarded without competitive bidding to repair the grid, was canceled (Wikipedia).
2018–2023
LUMA takes over the grid and Genera the power plants.
Decided by: Legislature and government

To get specialized private management without laying anyone off, LUMA takes over the grid and Genera the plants, and 3,725 employees move to other agencies. PREPA's retirement system, which already had a large deficit, is left with almost no one contributing: it runs out of funds in 2023 and, since 2025, pensions are charged on the bill.

Learn more
What was sought: Specialized private management without putting people out of work: instead of layoffs, 3,725 employees moved to other agencies.
How it drifted: More than half of the grid workforce did not move to LUMA. PREPA's retirement system was left with almost no one contributing (243 active employees for ~10,000 retirees).
What it cost: A pension system with no funds since 2023. It was covered with stopgap loans and, since 2025, with a charge on the bill (1.9¢ per kWh).
More context: Act 120-2018 enabled the public-private partnerships. LUMA took over transmission and distribution on June 1, 2021, and Genera PR took over generation on July 1, 2023.
2024–2026
Rooftop solar, shifting renewable targets and a record bill.
Decided by: Legislature, government and regulator

Those who installed solar panels are protected, coal is extended to 2032 to ensure firm power, and fuel already burned is charged to customers. With fewer kWh bought from the grid, fixed costs are spread over fewer customers, and the bill reaches a record 33.9¢ per kWh.

Learn more
What was sought: Certainty for those who installed solar (Act 10-2024), firm electricity in the face of outages (Act 1-2025: coal until 2032), and a system able to pay for fuel already burned (October 2026 bill).
How it drifted: With fewer kWh bought from the grid, fixed costs are spread over fewer customers.
What it cost: The highest bill on record: 33.9¢ per kWh.
More context: Act 10-2024 kept net metering in place until 2030–2031, and the Oversight Board sued to annul it. Act 1-2025 eliminated the interim renewable targets. On April 16, 2025 there was another island-wide blackout, and in April 2026 the Energy Bureau rejected the base-rate increase.
What ties the steps together: at each moment, the path chosen was the one that protected people from an immediate blow (a rate hike, a bankruptcy, a blackout). Each one pushed the cost forward, with interest.